What causes recoveries? How good policy and good luck can trigger the upward side of the business cycle by David A. Price
I
n the 1870s, the English economist W. Stanley Jevons
studied a century and a half of trade data and 
concluded that recessions of the English economy were
caused by the cycles of solar activity. He was “perfectly
convinced,” he wrote, that recessions “depend upon 
meteorological variations of the like period, which again
depend, in all probability upon cosmical variations of which
we have evidence in the frequency of sunspots, auroras,
and magnetic perturbations.” 
Regrettably, astronomers revised their estimates of 
solar cycles, and Jevons’s theory did not survive the revision. 
An  American economist, Henry Moore of Columbia
University, fine-tuned Jevons’s theory in 1923, giving a 
predominant role in recessions to the cycles of Venus in 
the Earth’s skies. This theory, too, failed to outlast extended
contact with the data.
The discipline of economics has come a long way 
since then in its ability to account for recessions.
Macroeconomists today consider the interaction of vari-
ables such as inventories, wages, interest rates, investments,
and, of course, profits. They also look at “exogenous” 
variables — factors hitting the system from outside — such
as technological changes, fuel-price shocks, and changes in
tax policy. The literature on recessions is voluminous;
indeed, if all the articles about recessions in the EconLit
database were laid end-to-end, they would reach all the way
to … well, they would reach awfully far.
Economists have had less to say about recoveries, 
however. “Most of macroeconomics presumes that the econ-
omy reverts [to growth] following a shock all by itself,” wrote
University of Chicago economist John Cochrane in the 1994
edition of the NBER Macroeconomics Annual. “For this 
reason, we usually focus on the shocks that start recessions
and their propagation mechanisms, but almost never … on
policies and shocks that end recessions.”
Cochrane’s observation a decade and a half ago still 
holds true today. When economists speak of recoveries, they
typically characterize them simply as a resumption of the
natural state of the economy: growth. 
Monetary Policy
Do economists have anything more to say about the causes
of recoveries, and the factors determining their strength? 
Is good policy simply a matter of taking away the cause of
the recession? Are all recoveries the result of wise monetary, 
fiscal, or regulatory interventions? What are the nonpolicy
forces, if any, that spark recoveries? Even though these ques-
tions have not been studied by economists as much as one
might expect, there is enough literature and historical prece-
dent to supply some tentative answers.
A leading paper on the subject by Christina and David
Romer of the University of California at Berkeley — aptly
titled “What Ends Recessions?” — examined the eight
recessions that had occurred in the United States between
1950 and the paper’s publication in 1994. (Christina Romer
was chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers
from January 2009 to September 2010.) The Romers looked
at measures of fiscal policy and monetary policy and ran 
several regressions comparing the economy’s actual behavior
with the GDP figures that would have resulted if policy-
makers had followed a hypothetical baseline policy. The
results indicated that monetary policy had a potent, 
“crucial” effect on recoveries; for each one-percentage-point
fall in the real federal funds rate, the researchers concluded,
real GDP increased between 1.5 percent and 3.0 percent on
average during the first year of recoveries. Conversely, the
monetary tightening that typically occurred before the peak
of the cycle had persistent effects that reduced growth 
during the recovery.
With regard to discretionary fiscal policy, in contrast, the
results indicated slight effects on GDP except during the
1973-1975 recession. The Romers thus attributed to discre-
tionary fiscal policy “at most a small role in recoveries.” They
found a greater role for automatic fiscal stabilizers, such as
the decreases that take place in tax collections during a
recession as incomes fall, and the increases in payouts of wel-
fare and unemployment benefits; these automatic changes
in fiscal policy added an average of 0.6 to 0.9 percentage
points to GDP growth during the first year of recoveries.
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SThe researchers did not attempt
to measure the effects of nonpolicy
factors on recoveries. Instead, they
lumped the effects of nonpolicy fac-
tors together as a residual value and
found that such factors appeared to
have “little effect on growth.”
Clean Balance Sheets 
Other economists who have studied
recoveries, however, believe that factors apart from mone-
tary policy and automatic fiscal stabilizers — including both
policy and nonpolicy factors — play important roles in
determining the recovery process. High among these are
balance sheets: those of companies, consumers, and the gov-
ernment. When it comes to igniting a recovery, clean
balance sheets are like kindling; overburdened ones are like
asbestos blankets.
George Perry and Charles Schultze of the Brookings
Institution, in a 1993 article in the Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, looked at the recovery following the reces-
sion of 1990-1991 and concluded that recovery was being
inhibited in part by the balance-sheet problems of highly
leveraged businesses. They noted that when interest pay-
ments become high in relation to cash flow, the firm tends to
become less willing to invest. Even if the spirit is willing,
moreover, the flesh becomes weak: On account of their 
balance sheets, highly leveraged firms that do seek to 
continue to expand must contend with impaired access to
additional credit at attractive interest rates. 
Although the ratio of corporate debt to GDPhad peaked
in early 1991 and declined since then, Perry and Schultze
argued that the decline was primarily due to falling 
interest rates — and that firms with already debt-heavy 
balance sheets might well be apprehensive of those rates
bouncing back up. Those apprehensions, in turn, would 
curtail investment on the part of those firms and thus slow
any recovery.
Benjamin Friedman of Harvard, commenting on Perry
and Schultze’s article, noted that during the six-year period
leading up to the 1990-1991 recession, more than half of the
net value of bonds issued by U.S. nonfinancial companies
essentially paid down equity. Such debt burdens, Friedman
argued, “would impair the economy’s ability to mount a 
sustained recovery after the recession ended.”
The balance sheets of consumers are even more signifi-
cant, argues an unpublished 2010 paper by Steven Gjerstad
and Vernon Smith of Chapman University. Gjerstad and
Smith surveyed post-war recoveries and concluded that new
residential construction is the primary transmission channel
for monetary policy during both downturns and recoveries
— and thus, if households’ balance sheets impair their 
ability to spend, monetary easing will have at most a minor
effect. “When household balance sheets are damaged in the
aftermath of a serious housing bubble and collapse,”
Gjerstad and Smith conclude, “households remain unre-
sponsive to accommodative mon-
etary policy as their focus turns to
de-leveraging rather than borrow-
ing for new housing assets or
durable goods.”
Countries, of course, have
their own balance sheets, which
could hamper a recovery if
national debt is excessive, accord-
ing to macroeconomic forecaster
and analyst Allen Sinai of Decision Economics. “You can
have a credit crunch in terms of the ability of the govern-
ment to finance its operations through Treasury issues
and/or the ability of the private sector to obtain financing,
because foreign investors don’t want to invest in a country
where the credit risk is high, the currency is going down, and
there’s a big overhang of debt,” says Sinai. “It’s a risk of us
tumbling back down into a downturn, as may happen to
some of those countries that have had to impose fiscal aus-
terity because of the nature of their sovereign problem.”
For the quickest and strongest recovery, Sinai says, 
“We need to be in a situation where we’re not financially
compromised — either households, companies, financial
intermediaries, or government.”
Confidence
A second factor with a major role in the recovery process is
confidence — what John Maynard Keynes called “animal
spirits.” When Harvard’s Lawrence Summers was director of
President Obama’s National Economic Council, he argued
in a speech that “panic and fear” are major obstacles to
recovery. “Businesses, consumers, and investors need to feel
both that recovery can be sustained and that the economy is
returning to a long-run sustainable path,” Summers main-
tained. “I cannot overstate the importance of confidence.”
For Summers, building confidence requires fiscal and
monetary discipline. Federal policymakers, he argued, can
contribute to confidence by eschewing any policy that might
“call into question our national commitment to sound
money, noninflationary growth, and sustainable devolution
of government debt.” In addition, Summers suggested, 
policymakers can build confidence by resolving policy 
issues as quickly as possible to minimize periods of policy
uncertainty.
Confidence can be built, but it can also be torn down. 
If political leaders can build confidence — and thus poten-
tially spur investment — by expressing support for policies
that businesses and investors perceive as helpful (and then
consistently carrying those policies out), they can also
destroy confidence with words that appear to be a prelude 
to adverse policy. The Panic of 1907 and its aftermath illus-
trate the role of language in building confidence — or
undermining it. Robert Bruner, dean of the Darden School
of Business at the University of Virginia and co-author of the
2007 book The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s
Perfect Storm, says that the panic led President Theodore
Region Focus | Fourth Quarter | 2010  15
When economists speak of
recoveries, they typically 
characterize them simply as a
resumption of the natural state
of the economy: growth. Roosevelt to rein in his populist rhetoric and to seek instead
to reassure the business community.
“ ‘Malefactors of great wealth’ is a phrase of Teddy
Roosevelt’s that echoes down through the decades,” Bruner
says. “This and other phrases and speeches reached an 
intensity in late 1906 and early 1907 that truly threatened
the investing public. The president in the first 10 days of the
panic itself finally caught on that perhaps he had overdone
the attack on wealth and Wall Street, and began to issue 
public statements to the effect that ‘we trust in the wisdom
of financial leaders to set things right.’ But once the genie
was out of the bottle, it proved very difficult for the utter-
ances of the President to simply restore the faith of the
public in the ability of the private market to achieve the 
outcomes they hoped for.”
Or as the late Walter Wriston, formerly chief executive
officer of Citicorp (now Citigroup), phrased it, “Money goes
where it is wanted and stays where it is well-treated.”
Consumer spending, like business spending, is influenced
by confidence. Christopher Carroll of Johns Hopkins
University found in a 1992 study that consumer pessimism
about unemployment leads — not surprisingly — to less
consumption. Using regressions that incorporated data from
the U.S. Commerce Department National Income and
Product Accounts and the University of Michigan’s Survey
of Consumers, Carroll found that an expectation of rising
unemployment rates leads consumers to prefer an increase
in savings and to avoid an increase in debt. Alevel of indebt-
edness that consumers find acceptable during boom times
may amount to recovery-killing “debt overhang” in reces-
sionary times, Carroll found — if consumers lack confidence
in the future.
Good Shocks
A third factor with a significant role in recovery is positive
exogenous shocks to the economy. Just as negative exoge-
nous shocks, such as the sharp sudden increases in fuel
prices of 1973, can push economic activity downward, 
good exogenous shocks can help GDP recover. Such shocks
could include a surge in foreign investment or an increase in
skilled immigration that fills critical needs. Peace, such as
the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, can also constitute a
good shock. 
The fact that these shocks are commonly labeled 
“exogenous” doesn’t mean that policymakers must simply
wait around for them to happen, however. When econo-
mists call such shocks “exogenous,” they are speaking a bit
casually, since the applicability of the term depends on how
one defines the system. These shocks may be outside the
influence of fiscal and monetary policy (although even that
is arguable), but they are not necessarily beyond the influ-
ence of policymaking in general. Foreign investment, for
instance, is affected by, among other things, tax policy and
currency-repatriation policy. 
Moreover, where policy cannot influence whether an
event happens, it may still influence the effects of the event:
Even a natural disaster — the classic example of an exoge-
nous event — might or might not be exogenous from the
standpoint of a macroeconomic model since the effects of a
natural disaster are influenced by policy factors such as
building codes and investments in forecasting systems.
Perhaps the ultimate good shock is technological innova-
tion. That was the thesis of Harvard University’s Joseph
Schumpeter, who held, starting in a series of articles in the
1910s, that the growth phase of business cycles is brought
about by entrepreneurial innovation; successful innovators
spur economic activity not only through their own efforts,
but also by inspiring imitators, all of which creates a surge of
investment. 
Schumpeter regarded the growth of railroads, and the
investment and development they generated, as a clear case
of this process during his lifetime. Amodern-day example is
the aftermath of the 1990-1991 recession, which initially 
was followed by a weak recovery; in the years immediately
following the trough, growth was at less than half the rate of
the recoveries of the 1960s and 1980s. Only with the
Internet boom of the mid-1990s — driven by the commer-
cialization of the World Wide Web — did the recovery catch
up to historical norms.
What Happened to Joe Palooka?
Historically, recessions during the post-World War II era
were followed by rapid GDP growth. The fastest growth,
moreover, occurred after the deepest recessions. Princeton
University’s Alan Blinder, writing in 1984 about the Reagan
recovery, called this regularity the “Joe Palooka effect” in 
reference to an inflatable punching bag with an image of the
cartoon boxer Joe Palooka on it. “Because he was weighted
at the bottom, he snapped right back when you punched
him to the floor,” Blinder explained. “And the harder you hit
him, the faster he came bouncing back.” 
Mr. Palooka hasn’t been taking punches like he used to;
the recovery from 1990-1991 recession was the first of three
disappointingly slow recoveries. Growth during the first two
years after the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions were just 2.1
percent and 2.2 percent respectively — far shallower than
the same periods during recoveries of the 1950s through the
1980s, which often brought growth rates higher than 6 per-
cent. Growth following the 2007-2009 recession also has
been relatively weak and by some measures appears to be
slowing further. The 1990-1991 recession also saw the advent
of the so-called “jobless” recovery, as employment did not
grow substantially during the year after the recession’s end
— a pattern that, too, repeated itself after the 2001 and
2007-2009 recessions
Hypotheses abound. Sinai of Decision Economics 
suggested in an American Economic Review article in May
2010 that businesses may have become reluctant to hire,
even during a recovery, on account of both the increasing
cost of labor (when benefits and payroll taxes are factored in)
and the proliferating substitutes for traditional hiring, 
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such as information technology, robotics, and the use of
modern telecommunications technology to interact with
technologically skilled workers in low-wage markets.
Diagnosing the reasons behind the new shape of
American recoveries — if, indeed, the last several recoveries
represent a long-term change — remains a challenge for the
economics discipline. Chicago’s Cochrane notes that it is an
unsolved puzzle. “In the early 20th century, we had frequent
deep recessions, but we bounced out of them quickly,” he
says. “Now we seem to be bouncing out of them slower and
slower. Europe certainly got to a position in the 1970s and
1980s where it would get stuck without ever bouncing out,
usually for various policy reasons. Maybe that’s what’s going
on now in the United States, too. That would be depressing.”
It surely would. On the other hand, anyone old enough to
have survived the stagflation of the 1970s and the recessions
of the early 1980s knows that thoughtful policy changes can
bring a powerful recovery even in exceptionally tough 
times. Joe Palooka may be woozy, but the ring doctor hasn’t
stopped the fight yet.  RF
Blinder, Alan. “The Joe Palooka Effect,” Boston Globe, 
Nov. 13, 1984, p. 48.
Carroll, Christopher D. “The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some
Macroeconomic Evidence.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
1992, no. 2, pp. 61-156.
Cochrane, John. “Comment.” In Fischer, Stanley and 
Julio J. Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994.
Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress, 1994.
Perry, George L., and Charles L. Schultze. “Was This Recession
Different? Are They All Different?” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 1993, no. 1, pp. 145-211.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. “What Ends
Recessions?” In Fischer, Stanley, and Julio J. Rotemberg (eds.),
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994. Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress,
1994.
Sinai, Allen. “The Business Cycle in a Changing Economy:
Conceptualization, Measurement, Dating.” American Economic
Review, May 2010, vol. 100, no. 2, pp. 25-29.
R EADINGS
WHAT CAUSES RECOVERIES? •  continued from page 16
FAILED BANKS •  continued from page 5
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
announced that it would begin issuing “shelf charters,” con-
ditional approval granted to investors seeking a national
bank charter. With a shelf charter, the investors complete
the preliminary paperwork to become a bank, but the char-
ter remains on hold (“on the shelf”) until the investors are in
a position to acquire a specific bank. At the same time as the
OCC rule change, the FDIC announced that it would open
the bidding to groups that did not currently have, but were
pursuing, a national bank charter, thereby allowing investors
with shelf charters to bid. Similarly, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), which regulates savings banks, reinsti-
tuted a “pre-clearance” process, further expanding the pool
of bidders. 
Although some believe that private equity ownership of
banks poses new risks, Kevin Mukri, spokesman for the
OCC, emphasizes that shelf charters are “not a loophole for
private investors. They can’t go off and do their own thing —
they have to become a national bank. They have to become
subject to all the national rules and regulations.” (Anational
bank is one that is chartered and regulated by the OCC
rather than by the state.)
So far, three investor groups have gone on to submit bids
and earn final approval from either the OCC or the OTS and
the FDIC. Being eligible to submit a bid doesn’t assure its
success. Regulators review the management, funding, and
business plans of would-be banks, and preliminary approval
isn’t a guarantee of final approval. Two of the three success-
ful bids were for banks in the Fifth District. Bay National
Bank in Baltimore was acquired by the Washington, D.C.
firm Hovde Private Equity Advisors LLC. First National
Bank of the South, based in Spartanburg, S.C., was pur-
chased by North American Financial Holdings,  which also
picked up two banks in Georgia and Florida. 
Both Bay National and First National were fairly young
banks, established in 2000, and they expanded rapidly, mak-
ing real estate loans during the boom years of the 2000s. It’s
a business model that was replicated across the nation, and
whose effects reverberate more than a year after the end of
the recession. In 2010, 157 banks failed in the United States,
up from 140 in 2009 and 25 in 2008, bringing the total to 322
since the beginning of 2008. In contrast, between 1995
(roughly the end of the Savings and Loan crisis) and 2007,
just 58 banks failed.
Tony Plath, a finance professor at the University of North
Carolina-Charlotte, expects the number of failures to bot-
tom out in 2011, although he projects that the industry may
yet lose another 500 banks. The FDIC currently has about
850 banks on its confidential “watch list.” Given the small
number of shelf charters, they may not be a major new
source of bank acquisitions. As the supply of failed banks
continues to increase, however, the industry may have to
turn to new sources of demand.
— JESSIE R OMERO